Want to Start World War III? Sink a US Navy Carrier

Aircraft Carrier

Sink a U.S. Navy Carrier

The Nimitz class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier

Since the 1950s, the supercarrier has been the foremost visible representation of U.S. military power and maritime hegemony. Although supercarriers have participated in nearly every military conflict since the commissioning of USS Forrestal in 1955, no carrier has come under determined attack from a capable opponent. In part, this is often because supercarriers are very difficult to attack, but the symbolic grandeur of the huge ships also plays a role; nobody wants to know what the United States might do if one among its carriers came under fire.

What would happen if a foe attacked a US Navy (USN) carrier during a conflict? How would the United States react, and the way US respond?

Circumstances:

Circumstances obviously matter for an attack on a US aircraft carrier. An out-of-the-blue attack from a conventionally armed state actor would enjoy the very best levels of success, but would even have an impression on elite and popular opinion within the US which may drive involves dire retribution. An attack as a part of a crisis would appear less extraordinarily hostile, but would nevertheless incur demands for a severe response. Finally, an attack during active hostilities might well represent a big escalation but would be least likely to elicit an enraged public response. Most devastating of all could be an attack by a non-state actor that resulted in significant casualties or the destruction of the carrier. this is able to undoubtedly inflame US popular opinion while leaving the US without a transparent path for response and retribution.

Escalatory Logic:

As a part of an ongoing military conflict, an attack against a USN carrier wouldn't necessarily represent a legal challenge; aircraft carriers are weapons of war, after all, and that they are even as susceptible to attack as the other weapon. But as military theorists have acknowledged for a minimum of two centuries, states choose their levels of escalation very carefully. Most wars are limited wars, and in limited wars, generals, admirals, and politicians are conscious of the political import of the targets they select. Consequently, some targets remain off-limits for states that want to stay a war limited, albeit those targets make a cloth contribution to the conduct of the conflict.

The US has enjoyed, for quite a while, a perception of untouchability around its most cherished, expensive, and effective military assets. Even with conventional naval and air forces, attacking a supercarrier is not any mean task, the USSR tried to develop effective anti-carrier weapons and tactics for many years, a search that China has now haunted. But aircraft carriers have an almost mythic symbolic importance, both in global opinion and within the self-conception of the U.S. Navy. No state has undertaken a determined attack against a USN carrier since war II.

Authorizing an attack against a USN supercarrier would require a weighty political decision. Political and senior military authorities might like better to simply damage a carrier, which might send America a message about vulnerability but that might not necessarily cause the deaths of in-depth numbers of U.S. personnel. However, it might be difficult for anyone to ensure limitations on damage, as a "lucky shot" might destroy the carrier. Granting the authority to attack a carrier would necessarily run the danger of sinking the ship. The USS Nimitz carries almost 6000 American military personnel and represents a huge expenditure of American treasure.

Attacking her, and thus endangering this blood and treasure, maybe is a very risky prospect indeed. The sinking of a U.S. carrier might well end in casualties that might exceed the entire losses of the Iraq War in no quite a couple of minutes. When capital ships sink, they often take nearly every crewman with them (1415) of a crew of (1418) went down with HMS Hood in 1941, for instance.

The targets of an attack against a carrier, in effect, would be the United States military capabilities, popular opinion, and elite opinion (defining elite opinion as including military and civilian leadership).

The political and military leadership of the foe would wish to believe that attacking the carrier was militarily feasible, that it might further operational or strategic goals, which the likely U.S. responses were manageable in military and political terms. On the operational and strategic levels, it isn't difficult to imagine a context during which damaging, destroying, or deterring a carrier would enable operational military success. Simply clearing the skies of F/A-18s and F-35s tends to form life easier for fielded military forces.

On the strategic side, an attack would convey a seriousness of commitment, while creating fear of vulnerability in America. Damaging or sinking a carrier would make the prices of war starkly clear to Americans, and might dissuade them from further conflict. Finally, any decision to escalate must take the potential U.S. response seriously and including either that America wouldn't escalate in response or that any U.S. response might be effectively managed.

Impact:

Much would depend upon the effectiveness of the attack. Even an unsuccessful attempt at attacking a supercarrier (an intercepted submarine sortie or a volley of ballistic missiles that did not reach the target, for example) would carry escalatory risks, although it might also indicate seriousness of purpose to U.S. policymakers.

The military impact of a successful strike against a carrier would be straightforward. A missile volley that either sank a carrier or led to a “mission-kill” by damaging the landing deck of a carrier into inoperability would deeply affect U.S. military operations, both by removing the carrier from the fight and from deterring America from deploying other carriers to the region.

The USN can deploy only a limited number of carriers at any given time. during a crisis, the USN could shift carriers around and stand up additional ships, but knocking out a carrier effectively eliminates around 10 percent of yank naval aviation strike power. The US has other options (cruise missiles, land-based air, assault carriers) but in many scenarios damaging or sinking a carrier could have a dramatic impact on the military balance.

However, a “mission-kill” wouldn't necessarily inflame US popular opinion, and might even create a way of vulnerability among the American people. Perhaps more importantly, such an attack might give U.S. policymakers (who have historically been more casualty-averse than the U.S. public) pause over the prices and benefits of the intervention. An attack that sank a carrier with significant casualties, on the opposite hand, might well end in demands for vengeance, the precise circumstances of the attack notwithstanding. this might put U.S. policymakers within the awkward position of wanting to escalate, without having the ability to use a number of the foremost lethal military options in their toolkit.

But again, the attacker would run severe risks. Damaging or sinking a carrier could end in a way stronger U.S. commitment to the conflict, also as a U.S. decision to escalate either vertically (by using additional weapon systems) or horizontally (by widening the geographic scope of the fight). Sinking a carrier would be an excellent way to turn war into a serious war, and there are only a few countries that might seriously contemplate major war against the United States.

Final Salvo:

It is unlikely that any foe will plan to attack a USN supercarrier accidentally. Launching an attack against a carrier represents a profound political-military decision to escalate the stakes of the conflict, and it's unlikely that a tactical commander (a sub skipper, for example) would be allowed to form such a choice on his or her own. If such an attack ever takes place during a crisis or a conflict, the policymakers on either side (not to say the remainder of the world) will be got to take very deep breaths and think hard about what subsequent steps could be.