The "Luftwaffe"

The "Luftwaffe"

There was a joke that was common among German soldiers in the latter stages of WWII: A recruit is told what aircraft to watch out for: “If you see plane and the plane is silver, then it’s American. And if you see a brown aircraft then the plane is British. And if the plane is invisible, then it’s the Luftwaffe!”

The "Luftwaffe" was never a strategic bombing air force. They were conceived and run as support for the German Army in it’s campaigns. Thus, the Luftwaffe was particularly badly suited by aircraft and training to fighting a bombing campaign designed to knock out the RAF or degrade Britain’s war production. They were slightly better suited to conducting a long range bombing campaign against Britain’s merchant shipping, but Hitler was too impatient for that kind of warfare and wanted a quick victory in Russia.

The aim of the Battle of Britain from a German perspective was to achieve air superiority. This in turn would have enabled landings of invasion forces (Operation Sea Lion)... Although it’s likely Hitler was hoping to force an armistice, rather than actually invade… But to force that, he needed to overcome the RAF in order to be able to put sufficient pressure on the British Government and people.

So the Luftwaffe’s Battle of Britain aim was disabling airfields, destroying fighters, shooting down pilots, and inflicting damage on infrastructure used for supplying/repairing fighters. As these were all relatively small targets, this required daytime bombing...

…The aim of most of the RAF - and thankfully, the ones who really mattered - was to prevent Germany from accomplishing it’s goals. The RAF’s aim was not to cripple/destroy as much of the Luftwaffe/its planes as possible, rather it was to maintain their own strength. In doing that, the RAF would be able to prevent the Luftwaffe from achieving air superiority.

The RAF accomplished that. Which is why the battle is considered a victory for the RAF and Allies. The attrition of planes, pilots, and support was just sustainable for the RAF, their tactics/logistics were enormously better than the Luftwaffe in this respect.

Their losses in trained pilots could never be made good because Germany (logically) put the greatest priority on keeping their army supplied and equipped for the campaign in Russia. The western allies needed air supremacy and actively sought it and really achieved it.

The rate of attrition wasn’t really sustainable for the Luftwaffe. But the Battle of Britain didn’t cripple the Axis or Luftwaffe per se - though it definitely demoralised them and the Nazi leadership to the point that they decided against continuing, and the losses (planes and pilots) sustained definitely hampered the Luftwaffe significantly!

At the start of the battle, the RAF had somewhere around 644 single engine fighters, and about 1,000 experienced/qualified fighter pilots. The Luftwaffe had around 700 single engine fighters, and about 1,450 experienced/qualified fighter pilots. Over the course of the battle, both sides produced/acquired more pilots… Aircraft production also increased; massively so for the RAF.

But at the outset… Things did not look good for the RAF!

The RAF tactics as outlined above were those of the commander of No. 11 Group - AVM Sir Keith Park. The preparations from/command by ACM Lord Dowding (home chain radar, observers; and supporting his Group Commanders while they beat the snot out of the Luftwaffe) were equally vital. It’s those command factors that won the battle. No. 10 Group’s AVM Sir Quintin Brand is worthy of great recognition also, for his significant contributions/mutual support of Sir Keith/generally a great commander too.

Sir Keith was a New Zealander, and Sir Quintin South African - this is rather fitting, as the pilots of the RAF were also extremely diverse; alongside British, there were stacks of Poles, New Zealanders, and Canadians. There were also many South Africans, Rhodesians, Czechs, Australians, Belgians, French, and even a Jamaican and a Palestinian (and others). That’s always worth noting for two reasons - it was a very global effort, and because Australia weren’t as big a part of it as New Zealand and Canada.

Sir Keith is one of the most crucial military commanders in the history of the world. He’s sadly under-recognised…

Here’s an overview map of the Battle of Britain, just taken off Wikipedia. It indicates just how massive Sir Keith’s responsibilities were.

Sir Keith defended South East England. He had ten airfields under his command. And was responsible for defending almost the entire range of the Nazi fighter support… And London… And a massive amount of the British logistical capacity. For over three months, he performed perfectly. In the North, 13 group had things relatively easy - though AVM Richard Saul and 13 definitely played their part by training pilots and allowing for rotation of squadrons to the north so they could get a bit of rest! 12 Group (the “big wing” guys’) leadership almost worked against Lord Dowding, 11 group and Sir Keith, and 10 group and Sir Quintin. Leadership of No 12 group aside, the rest of the RAF were a tight, well-oiled machine and all the parts worked together extremely well. That was critically important.

But… Sir Keith’s No 11 group had the lion’s share of responsibility, and took the most casualties, etc.

Sir Quintin and No 10 group also had to contend with being within Luftwaffe fighter range, as well often being called upon to protect 11 Group’s airfields when they were exposed (and when 12 group didn’t despite it being their job to…) … Sir Quintin supported Lord Dowding and Sir Keith in the “Big Wing” controversy (he too got punished for that).

“I don't believe it is recognised how much this one man, with his leadership, his calm judgment and his skill, did to save not only this country, but the world.”

"If any one man won the Battle of Britain, he did,"

"The awesome responsibility for this country's survival rested squarely on Keith Park's shoulders."

By 1944 the Luftwaffe was almost completely on the defensive and overwhelmed by the material superiority of the Allied air-forces.

In Guy Sajer’s “The Forgotten Soldier” the author comes back from leave where he witnessed the mass bombing of some German city. His friends ask him “wasn’t the Luftwaffe present?” And he replied “yes, but against such overwhelming numbers?” It must have been terrifying to see thousands of heavy bombers coming over in an endless stream dropping their bombs in a curtain. That kind of mechanical mass production of force was beyond German industry to produce during the war.